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Abstract 
This paper examines how the largest stock market of the world, the U.S., and particularly the 
S&P500 index, reacted during the COVID-19 outbreak (02.01.2020-30.04.2020). Using simple 
financial analysis procedures for our theoretical framework, we juxtapose the released news 
with the respective market performance in order to examine if the stock market always 
incorporated the available information in time. We show that the market in some sub-periods 
was not moving as it was expected, and the runs-test statistically confirmed our assumptions 
that the US stock market was not always efficient during the COVID-19 outbreak. The market’s 
behavior is unpredictable for a rational asset pricing model because as this paper shows even 
the simplest financial theories could explain rational behavior, but the market presented a 
different performance.    
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1. Introduction 
On 31 December 2019, the World Health Organization (WHO) China Country Office was 
informed of cases of pneumonia of unknown etiology (unknown cause) detected in Wuhan 
City, Hubei Province of China. The Chinese authorities identified a new type of coronavirus, 
which was isolated on 7 January 2020.  The WHO named the novel coronavirus, Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), and the disease coronavirus disease 
(COVID-19)1. On 30 January, WHO declared the outbreak a Public Health Emergency of 
International Concern (PHEIC)2, and on 11 March, WHO Director General characterized COVID-
19 as a pandemic3.  
This brief timeline of the COVID-19 outbreak shows that since 30 January 2020 (at least) the 
health risk worldwide due to COVID-19 has significantly increased. Was the U.S. stock market, 
the largest stock market of the world, efficient and rational during the first months of the 
COVID-19 outbreak? We use the widely accepted S&P500 as a market index, and the sample 
period we examine is the 02.01.2020-30.04.2020.  
The COVID-19 outbreak gives us the opportunity to examine the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(EMH) in an extreme stress period, and to suggest some new factors that should be included 
in the EMH study, such as the promptness and the rationality of the stock markets. According 
to Fama (1970) and his seminal paper for the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH):  
• “… the theory of efficient markets is concerned with whether prices at any point in 
time "fully reflect" available information.” 
• “Strong-form tests are concerned with whether individual investors or groups have 
monopolistic access to any information relevant for price formation.” 
• “…semi-strong-form tests the information subset of interest includes all obviously 
publicly available information, while in the weak form tests the information subset is 
just historical price or return sequences”. 
 
1 Some highlights from the Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) SITUATION REPORT – 1 (World Health 
Organization): https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200121-
sitrep-1-2019-ncov.pdf  
2 The term Public Health Emergency of International Concern is defined in the International Health 
Regulations as “an extraordinary event which is determined, as provided in these Regulations: (i) to 
constitute a public health risk to other States through the international spread of disease; and (ii) to 
potentially require a coordinated international response”. This definition implies a situation that: is 
serious, unusual or unexpected; carries implications for public health beyond the affected State’s 
national border; and may require immediate international action. 
(source: https://www.who.int/ihr/procedures/pheic/en/) 
3 https://www.who.int/westernpacific/emergencies/covid-19 
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Did the stock index incorporate all the available information at any point in time? The 
information we mention in this study is the publicly available information regarding the 
COVID-19 outbreak. Any investor, individual or not, could have had access to the public 
information regarding COVID-19. We present how a price evaluation technique should work 
in theory based on fundamental financial analysis. This approach is easy to explain and 
understand, therefore, we can show that in some periods even though the stock prices should 
have a specific performance (growth/recession) the empirical evidence shows a different 
direction. 
Using simple statistical techniques and econometric procedures, we show that the largest 
stock market of the world was not efficient during the examined period. In some periods, the 
market’s response is slow and not consistent with the financial theory. These results show 
that something is missing from asset pricing models, and COVID-19 gives financial economists 
a chance to examine why investors underestimated the health risk, making the stock market 
inefficient.  
A very interesting interview of Nobel laureates E. Fama and R. Thaler where they discuss 
predictability and market behavior prompted us to study the behavior of the US stock market 
during this outbreak. Even though the two distinguished professors adopt different 
approaches in finance, and in many cases disagree, at some point in their discussion they 
agree on the following: the market’s behavior is not always predictable for a rational model4. 
Thus, the purpose of this study is to theoretically and quantitatively show the inefficiency and 
the irrationality of the market, and to raise some questions as to whether terms such as 
predictable behavior should be included in the EMH discussion.      
The rest of the paper goes as following: Section 2 presents the theoretical framework 
regarding how the health risk due to COVID-19 should influence the stock market and Section 
3 presents a basic financial analysis framework for the process of evaluating stock prices. 
Section 4 provides empirical evidence of the S&P 500 index performance during the COVID-
19 outbreak and analyses the outcomes. Section 5 uses the runs test in order to 
econometrically and quantitatively examine the efficiency of the U.S. stock market during the 
examined period, and Section 6 concludes the study. 
 
 
4 The interview is available on https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bM9bYOBuKF4&t=1879s, and the 
part we mentioned is on 28:39-28:53. 
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2. Health Risk, Economic Activity and Financial Markets: a Theoretical Framework. 
A question which emerges is: should a pandemic influence an economy and its stock market? 
The reply is “yes”. A pandemic affects a large number of people and causes widespread 
devastation. Many people get sick, the death toll rises and the healthcare system struggles to 
cope with a surge in hospitalizations. In order to contain the spread of the virus, social 
distancing measures and lockdowns are implemented, which causes the economic activity to 
slow down (Almond, & Mazumder (2005), Garret (2008), and Keogh‐Brown, Wren‐Lewis, 
Edmunds, Beutels, & Smith (2010)). As a consequence, a lot of businesses reduce their 
production, unemployment figures skyrocket and consumption is reduced due to income 
shrinkage. This means that companies have reduced profits, the growth expectations are 
revised negatively and so forth.  
Moreover, a behavioral explanation is that the health risk turns to economic and financial risk 
because the investors’ risk aversion increases when an economic crisis emerges (Cohn et al. 
(2015), Malmendier and Nagel (2011)), and/or when the health risk increases (Decker and 
Schmitz (2016))5. Therefore, the increased health risk due to COVID-19, should increase risk 
aversion, and the economic slowdown/crisis caused by the pandemic should further increase 
risk aversion, thus the stock market should be under crisis. Al-Awadhi, Al-Saifi, Al-Awadhi and 
Alhamadi (2020) provide empirical evidence for the negative influence of COVID-19 on the 
Chinese stock market performance, and confirm the previously mentioned financial theories.   
 
3. A Financial Analysis Framework  
Ιn financial markets, two of the most important measures for financial decisions are the 
expected rate of return (?̂?), and the expected standard deviation (σ). Based on these 
measures, we examine the process of an investor’s financial evaluation, using Figure 1(a). An 
investor may take into consideration n possible scenarios. Each scenario has a probability i, 
where i=1,2,…n, to be confirmed, and for each scenario there is the respective expected 
outcome based on an asset pricing model.  
If we assume that there is an asset pricing model that accurately estimates the expected 
return per case when the financial conditions are described, the crucial parameter is the 
 
5 …and an upcoming pandemic increases the health risk. 
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probability for each Scenario to play out in the real world. The expected rate and the standard 
deviation are estimated using the following formulas: 
𝑬𝒙𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑹𝒆𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒏 = ?̂? = ∑ 𝑷𝒊 × 𝒓𝒊
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏        (1) 
, where Pi= the probability of occurrence of some financial conditions that lead to a respective 
return ri , i= the event/scenario 1, 2, …, n, and  
𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝑫𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 = 𝝈 =  √(𝒓𝒊 − ?̂?)𝟐 × 𝑷𝒊    (2) 
We assume that initially we are in late December 2019 (or even in early January 2020), and 
we make our investment plans for 2020: Scenario 1 is the best-case scenario, Scenario 2 the 
second best, …, and Scenario n is the worst. Every investor has her/his own scenarios under 
specific possibilities and her/his own estimations regarding each scenario’s outcome. The 
stock market’s performance is configured by the cumulative estimations of the investors. 
When the investors that include more positive scenarios-we call them for the purpose of this 
paper optimistic-are more than the investors that adopt moderate and/or negative scenarios, 
the stock market will go up and vice versa. The greater the disagreements of the market 
participants/investors regarding the values of stock prices, the higher the stock market’s 
standard deviation will be. 
For the COVID-19 case, when the news regarding the clustered cases of pneumonia in Wuhan 
was released, was a pandemic scenario included in the evaluation process? If the pandemic 
scenario was not in the evaluation process, the expected return is overestimated, and the 
expected risk is underestimated because a negative scenario has not been taken into 
consideration (equations (1) and (2)). Up to the first days of January, the news was not so 
worrying, and therefore the absence of the pandemic scenario may not be so irrational. 
However, the financial markets are not static. The scenarios dynamically change as new 
information comes to light. As the news regarding the COVID-19 outbreak is released, the 
probability of a pandemic should:  
• be taken into consideration, if the n scenarios of Figure 1(a) did not include a 
pandemic scenario, and  
• increase, if one of the n scenarios of Figure 1(a) included a pandemic scenario which 
was possible, but not highly probable.  
For any individual investor/portfolio manager this means that the revised expected returns 
should be lower, and the standard deviation higher, when the pandemic scenario is close to 
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confirmation. All these differences should be depicted in market performance: lower return 
estimations and increased standard deviations.   
In Figure 1(b), we assume that we are on the day of the PHEIC announcement, the stock 
market has the information for a very bad scenario regarding the COVID-19 spread around the 
globe, and therefore it theoretically should decline. Depending on the other m-scenarios, e.g. 
the investors’ expectations regarding the pandemic influence on the U.S. stock market, the 
expectations regarding government response to the COVID-19 outbreak (protective measures 
against the virus spread, economic relief measures against a recession) etc., new estimations 
regarding the expected return and standard deviations of the asset prices will be estimated. 
Similar procedures will be followed when the pandemic is declared.  
If the stock market evaluates the new information as positive (negative) the stock market 
prices should increase (decrease).  In Figure 1(b), we have described some indicative sub-
scenarios so as to show how this procedure creates multiple different sub-scenarios, which 
closely approximate possible real-life events, based on one initial scenario.  
Depending on the scenarios, their possibility to occur, and the estimations of each scenario’s 
outcome, each investor draws his/her strategy, and all the investors together shape the 
market’s performance. This procedure is dynamic, and depending on the news, all these 
parameters are constantly revised.  
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Figure 1: The Expected Return and Standard Deviation Scenarios during the COVID-19 outbreak. 
(a) The expected return and standard deviation before the release of the news regarding COVID-19. 
   
Expected Return and 
Standard Deviation
Scenario 1 P1 r1
Scenario 2 P2 r2
Scenario 3 P3 r3
.
.
.
Scenario n-1 Pn-1 rn-1
Scenario n Pn rn
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(b) The expected return and standard deviation when the news shows that COVID-19 turns to a PHEIC/Pandemic. 
  
COVID-19
PHEIC/Pandemic 
Scenario Expected 
Return and 
Standard Deviation
Scenario 1: COVID-19 
will not influence the 
U.S.
P1-PHEIC/pandemic r1-PHEIC/pandemic
Scenario 2: COVID-19 
will slightly influence 
the U.S.
P2-PHEIC/pandemic r2-PHEIC/pandemic
Scenario 3: COVID-19  
will have a low death 
toll, and the 
government will 
provide a large 
stimulus package.
P3-PHEIC/pandemic r3-PHEIC/pandemic
.
.
.
Scenario (m-1) worst 
case death toll 
scenario, poor 
stimulus package
P(m-1) -PHEIC/pandemic r(m-1) -PHEIC/pandemic
Scenario m: worst case 
death toll scenario, no 
relief programs.
Pm-PHEIC/pandemic rm-PHEIC/pandemic
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4. S&P 500 index performance during the COVID-19 outbreak. 
Using data from the S&P 500, we examine how the most popular investment index of the U.S. 
stock market reacted during the COVID-19 outbreak. We separate our data in three basic sub-
periods which are based on the WHO reports6:  
i. 1st period: 02.01.2020 – 29.01.2020: first notice by the Chinese authorities up to the 
day before the PHEIC declaration 
ii. 2nd period: 30.01.2020-10.03.2020: after the PHEIC declaration up to the day before 
the pandemic declaration  
iii. 3th period: 11.03.2020-30.04.2020: the post-pandemic declaration period.  
Figure 2 presents the cumulative returns from the beginning of the year to 30 April, 2020 the 
timeline of the abovementioned dates, and the respective performance of the market. Table 
1 presents the cumulative returns per period and the respective standard deviation, adopting 
the following formulas: 
• the daily returns, which are estimated by the formula  
𝐃𝐚𝐢𝐥𝐲 𝐑𝐞𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐧𝐬𝐭 = 𝒓𝒕 =
𝐒&𝑃 500 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐭
𝐒&𝑃 500 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐭−𝟏
− 𝟏                     (3) 
, when t is the S&P 500 Price on day t and t-1 is the S&P 500 Price in the previous date, 
• the cumulative returns, which are estimated by the formulae 
𝑪𝒖𝒎𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝑹𝒆𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒏𝒔 𝒑𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒅 = [∏ (𝟏 + 𝒓𝒊)
𝑵
𝒊=𝟏 ] − 𝟏   (4) 
, where ri = the daily return of the stock index in day i, and i=1,2,…,N the first day of 
the period up to the last one, and 
• 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝑫𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒑𝒆𝒓 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒅 = √
∑ (𝒓𝒊−𝒓𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆)𝟐
𝑵
𝒊=𝟏
𝑵−𝟏
   (5) 
, where raverage= the mean return during the examined period. 
We examine the performance of the stock market during the respective periods in order to 
draw some conclusions regarding the market’s rationality and efficiency. The explanation of 
the market’s responses to the news during the COVID-19 outbreak is based on the following 
assumptions: 
 
6 WHO reports were publicly available to all investors; therefore, the news should be incorporated in the 
stock prices.  
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- when the return seems irrational it could be a false estimation of a period, but when 
the standard deviation of this period is low this means either that there is no new 
information that could significantly influence the prices or that most participants in 
the market agree that the prices are fair, 
- when the stock market presents increased standard deviation, it may be an indication 
for: 
o  increased news of different directions (positive, and negative), and/or 
o  counterarguments regarding the stock market’s fair value, and/or 
o investors’ overreaction which is aptly described by De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985): “In revising their beliefs, individuals tend to overweight recent 
information and underweight prior (or base rate) data.”7.   
- when the risk (standard deviation) regarding the economic conditions in the U.S. is 
increased, an individual investor will try either to find alternative investments to the 
U.S. stock market, or (s)he will ask for increased required rate of return. In both cases, 
the stock market should fall. In finance, the negative relationship between risk and 
return is described by the leverage effect, which is the tendency of the stock prices to 
present higher volatility during large price falls than the respective volatility during 
growth periods. 
 
 
7 This adequately explains what happens during increased volatility periods, when significant news is 
brought to light. 
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Figure 2: S&P 500 the cumulative returns 02.01.2020-30.04.2020. 
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Table 1: The S&P 500 performance during the COVID-19 outbreak.  
Period 02.01.2020.-30.04.2020 02.01.2020-29.01.2020 30.01.2020-10.03.2020 11.03.2020-30.04.2020 
Cumulative Returns -9.85% 1.32% -11.95% 1.05% 
Standard Deviation 3.37% 0.66% 2.65% 4.57% 
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Below we present the data during the examined sub-periods. 
 
(a) The 02.01.2020-29.01.2020 period.  
During the first period, the results show that the stock market presents a performance similar 
to that of a normal/growth period8: 1.32% return, and 0.66% standard deviation. The results, 
and especially the low standard deviation, show that the stock market probably 
underestimated the COVID-19 risk, e.g. investors assumed that COVID-19 could be contained 
in China. Supporters of the EMH could argue that up to the PHEIC declaration the news 
regarding the spread of COVID-19 was not so worrying and hence the normal performance 
measures are rational and efficient.  
However, how rational is the argument that in a globalized financial environment COVID-19 
would not travel to the U.S.? We present some thoughts: before the COVID-19 outbreak there 
were more than 160 thousand flights per day, and for many of them the final destination was 
the U.S.9. On 2 February, 2020 restrictions on travel from China came into effect in the U.S.10; 
however, estimations show that up to this date hundreds of thousands of people have already 
travelled directly from China to the U.S.11, and probably many other passengers have travelled 
to the U.S. from other countries where cases of COVID-19 had already been documented. 
Therefore, the authorities and markets should have strongly suspected that COVID-19 has 
travelled from China (and/or indirectly from any other place of the world, e.g. Europe12), and 
there could potentially be cases of COVID-19 in any state.  
Up to this period, there are no strict measures (lockdowns, social distance measures etc.)  in 
the U.S.. Was it rational to assume that a highly contagious virus would not spread to the U.S. 
where 82.46% of the population lives in urban areas13? Social distance measures which were 
adopted to limit the spread of the virus require at least 1-meter (3 feet) distance14. During 
normal periods in urban settings do people keep such a distance between each other, e.g. in 
buses, trains, airports, schools etc.? Usually, no. Therefore, there were many possibilities that 
 
8 For example, in 2019 the S&P500 presented a 28.88% growth (2.41% on average per month) and 
0.79% daily standard deviation. 
9 https://www.flightradar24.com/ 
10 https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-suspension-entry-immigrants-
nonimmigrants-persons-pose-risk-transmitting-2019-novel-coronavirus/  
11 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/04/us/coronavirus-china-travel-restrictions.html 
12 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-08/most-nyc-covid-19-cases-came-from-
europe-genome-researchers-say 
13 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?locations=US 
14 https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/advice-for-public 
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the virus was not only present in the U.S., but there was also a good possibility that it was 
already spreading within the U.S.. Additionally, people 65 years and older are at higher risk 
for severe illness and complications from the disease, which means that the death toll might 
be significantly high in a country where 16.21% of the population is over 65 years old15. 
Moreover, during this period the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reports 
the first COVID-19 case on 19 January, and a second one on 24 January16. Even if there was no 
scenario of wide spread of COVID-19 in the U.S. stock market, this piece of news should create 
one because the first COVID-19 cases are proof that the disease has travelled to the U.S., and 
in theory, this should lead to market decline, and/or increased volatility.  
In order to examine in theory if the stock market adequately evaluated the aforementioned 
thoughts and facts, we ask the following question: if the stock market during this period 
presented a lower return, and increased standard deviation, would these performance 
measures be irrational? If the reply is negative, the real stock market prices do not include all 
the available information.  
Moreover, using the theoretical framework and the n-possible scenarios we presented in 
Section 3, was it rational not to have taken into consideration any scenario where COVID-19 
could spread outside China and/or that could have travelled in the U.S.? If these scenarios 
were not considered during this period, then the stock market significantly have 
underestimated the health risk that COVID-19 poses. Perhaps, the stock market participants 
believed that SARS-Cov-2 would be contained in the same way SARS-Cov-1 and MERS were, 
two viruses which ended up having a relatively small effect on the economy, but as we 
presented above with 160 thousand flights per day, a highly contagious virus could travel 
worldwide in a few days.   
 
(b) The 30.01.2020-10.03.2020 period. 
In Table 1, the results show that the market is efficient when we examine the market 
performance from the beginning to the end of the period: cumulative returns show an 11.95% 
decline and an increased standard deviation to 2.65%. This is an indication that the stock 
 
15https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.65UP.TO.ZS?end=2018&locations=US&start=2018&vi
ew=map  
16 We used information from https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-federal-governments-
coronavirus-actions-and-failures-timeline-and-themes/ to timeline the facts. 
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market evaluated the increased health risk after the PHEIC announcement. However, the data 
show that the response was not instant as the EMH suggests.  
For the 30.01.2020-21.02.2020 period the performance measures are: 1.97% returns, 0.82% 
daily standard deviation. If we only focus on these performance measures, could we 
understand that something worrying as the PHEIC was announced? Possibly the reply would 
be negative. These results show that the stock market keeps underestimating the virus spread 
for many days after the PHEIC. The negative scenarios regarding the COVID-19 outbreak seem 
to be underestimated for 3 weeks after the PHEIC. Was the market’s response to the PHEIC 
rational? 
In theory, we should have switched from the initial scenarios/regimes where the likelihood of 
COVID-19 spreading was little to zero, Figure 1(a), to the second evaluation procedure, Figure 
1(b), in which the likelihood of a global spread was greater. Up to this date no strict measures 
had been taken to stem the spread of the virus. Therefore, in the period 30.01.2020-
21.02.2020 the EMH does not seem to work. Was the market inefficient because its response 
was irrational and/or slow? As Thaler mentions in the interview: could the market’s behavior 
be predictable for a rational model?  
In the following week (24/2-28/2), the S&P500 suffered an 11.49% loss. This was a week in 
which many stock markets suffered significant losses17. In the U.S., some significant news 
explains the sharp market decline: 
• 24.02: the request for $2.5 billion supplementary funds 
• 25.02: the C.D.C. Warn of Coronavirus Outbreaks in the U.S.18 
• 26.02: the CDC report the first case of community spread. Community spread means 
spread of an illness for which the source of infection is unknown.  
Up to 28.02.2020, there were only 63 confirmed COVID-19 cases and no deaths19, but the 
market seems to discount an upcoming health and economic crisis: prices fall 17.87%, and the 
standard deviation increases to 3.89% during the 24/2-10/3 period. The stock market sooner 
 
17 During this week the major European stock markets presented sharp declines. This is the week after 
the report by the Italian authorities regarding clustered COVID-19 cases in Northern Italy: 
https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/outbreak-novel-coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-
19-situation-italy 
18 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/25/health/coronavirus-us.html  
19 First death in the US was reported on 29 February 
(https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/us/) 
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or later incorporates the COVID-19 risk and its economic consequences in the stock prices20. 
The questions that emerge are the following: 
- the PHEIC was an official health alarm; why was the pandemic risk not incorporated 
(or significantly underestimated) up to 21.02.2020?, 
- could an asset pricing model forecast if there will be a slow response by the investors? 
and 
- could a rational model predict exactly when the prices will start to incorporate the 
news? 
If we accept a delay in incorporating COVID-19 risk in market prices, we conclude that the 
market is not efficient, because it does not always incorporate all the available information at 
any point in time. 
 
(c) The 11.03.2020-30.04.2020 period. 
During the third period (the post-pandemic declaration period), the stock market gains 1.05% 
and the standard deviation is 4.57%. The pandemic declaration, as well as the increased 
COVID-19 cases and deaths due to the pandemic, in theory should further increase the health 
risk and lead to further decline in the stock market and an increase in volatility. Does the 1.05% 
performance mean that the stock market had instantly and rationally evaluated the 
ramifications of the pandemic before its declaration? If we examine the sub-period as one 
period, this could be an explanation, however, similar to the second period, the third period 
should also be divided in two sub-periods: 
- a recession period 11.03.2020 – 23.03.2020, during which the stock market presents 
22.37% losses, and 6.85% standard deviation, and  
- a rocket growth period 24.03.2020-30.04.2020, during which the stock market 
presents 30.17% growth, and 3.21% standard deviation. 
Is the sharp decline (ir)rational? Is the rocket growth (ir)rational? Both? Neither? Let’s see 
some of the news during the post-pandemic declaration period. During the sub-period of the 
sharp decline, there are reports of increased health risk and economic slowdown:  
- cancelation and suspension of sport events (12/3),  
 
20 And this is rational. Even if the market tried to avoid incorporating the health risk, it would eventually 
incorporate it when COVID-19 cases start to rise and the deaths are documented. 
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- on 13.03.2020 the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
reports amongst other that if no measures take place21:   
• “A pandemic will last 18 months or longer and could include multiple 
waves of illness”, 
• “Increasing COVID -19 suspected or confirmed cases in the U.S. will result 
in increased hospitalizations among at-risk individuals, straining the 
healthcare system”, and  
• “Supply chain and transportation impacts due to ongoing COVID - 19 
outbreak will likely result in significant shortages for government, private 
sector, and individual U.S. consumers.” 
- on 15.03.2020 CDC recommends against any gathering of 50 or more people for an 
eight-week period,  
- on 16.03.2020 Imperial College projects 2.2 million deaths in the U.S., and on the 
same day President Trump halts social activities for groups larger than 10 people, and  
- on 17.03.2020 the New York Times revealed the HHS report. 
Most of the aforementioned news is not good and therefore the sharp decline in the market 
shows that the previous sharp decline during the second period was not an ex-ante discount 
for an upcoming pandemic declaration, and the 22.37% loss during the first post pandemic 
period is proof22. The 22.37% decline is explained by the fact that the news is bad during the 
11.03.2020-23.03.2020 period, and generates negative scenarios which are more likely to 
materialize (as we explained using Figure 1). 
During the growth period 24.03.2020-30.04.2020, market growth is 30.17%, most trading days 
are profitable and, in some days, significantly profitable (9.38%, 7.03%, 6.24%...). The 
environment, if we focus only on the returns, shows that the pandemic is over, but this does 
not reflect what is happening in real life: people are still dying from COVID-19, an increased 
number of cases have been documented during this period, and there is no vaccine. What was 
the news that has led to the 30.17% growth?  
The boost was given on 24.03.2020 by the $2 trillion stimulus pack which will be given in order 
to save the national economy. Definitely, this is the new information that stopped the stock 
market decline, and boosted recovery. Few days later, on Sunday 29, March, Dr. Anthony 
Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, said that maybe 
 
21 However, this report was unclassified but not for public distribution, therefore on 13.03.2020 the 
report was not released to the public.  
22 In other words, the return 
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more than 100,000 Americans could die of COVID-19, and that the US is going to have “millions 
of cases”. Does this statement include any good news? It may sound weird, but “yes”; if the 
stock market had previously taken a much higher death toll as given, e.g. 2.2 million, a 
projection of 100,000 deaths is still horrifying yet significantly lower than 2.2 million. 
Therefore, using again the procedure of Figure 1, the previous scenario (2.2 million deaths) 
overestimated the health risk, and the new scenario for a lower death toll is a reason for the 
increase in asset prices (upward revision). Similarly, on 09.04.2020, the new estimation of 60k 
deaths due to COVID-19 is a positive piece of information. Table 2 presents the third period 
timeline, and the sources23.  
There are some interesting results in the third period. The increased standard deviations when 
there is sharp decline are consistent with the leverage effect, but the high volatility during the 
30.17% rocket growth period may hide a disagreement regarding the fair value of the prices 
(the standard deviation during this period is 3.21%, when during the 02.01.2020-29.01.2020 
period a 1.32% growth is combined with a 0.66% standard deviation). As it has been 
mentioned, a behavioral explanation for the high volatility periods may be linked to the 
overreaction issue (De Bondt and Thaler (1985))24. However, the EMH school of thought may 
also have another explanation, because the $2 trillion stimulus pack may generate 
controversial results. It may be a positive measure for the reduction of the economic impact 
of the pandemic, but it may lead to an inflation regime which presents counterarguments 
regarding its influence on the asset prices:  
- Fama and Schwert (1977) show negative results in stock markets prices and inflation, 
while  
- Boudoukh and Richardson (1993) argue that there is “a positive relation between 
nominal stock returns and inflation at long horizons” because the income generated 
by real assets should be a hedge against inflation.  
Which explanation describes rational/irrational behavior? In theory, both explanations are 
correct. However, is it easy to ex-ante predict if the stock market will adopt the short-term or 
the long-term inflation scenario?  
 
23 We should note that there could be timelines that may be more detailed e.g. 
https://www.defense.gov/Explore/Spotlight/Coronavirus/DOD-Response-Timeline/. We present some 
basic information that serves our paper’s scope: to explain how the markets work, and how the news 
is incorporated to the stock market values. 
24 This is a plausible explanation when examining increased volatility periods during which a lot of news 
comes to light. 
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Moreover, even if we accept that the stimulus pack is a strong factor that turns the financial 
trend from negative to positive: is the 30.17% growth rational when COVID-19 still threaten 
the U.S. and the entire world? The stock market presented a slow response when the news 
where negative (e.g. PHEIC), however the positive influence of the economic relief programs 
seems to be instantly incorporated in the stock prices even though the health risk still exists. 
Therefore, is the market’s response always predictable for a rational model or not?  
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Table 2: The basic news during the post-pandemic period. 
Trading Date Events 
11/3/2020 Pandemic Declaration 
https://www.who.int/westernpacific/emergencies/covid-19 
12/3/2020 Nearly every major sporting event in the United States is suspended or canceled 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/12/sports/coronavirus-sports-canceled.html 
13/3/2020 The United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) reports that: “They are 
necessary to facilitate planning development efforts.”, otherwise 
• “A pandemic will last 18 months or longer and could include multiple waves of 
illness”, 
•  “Increasing COVID -19 suspected or confirmed cases in the U .S. will result in 
increased Hospitalizations among at-risk individuals, straining the healthcare 
system”, and  
• “Supply chain and transportation impacts due to ongoing COVID - 19 outbreak will 
likely result in significant shortages for government, private sector, and individual 
U. S. consumers.” 
We must note that the specific report was marked as unclassified. 
https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/6819-covid-19-response-
plan/d367f758bec47cad361f/optimized/full.pdf#page=1    
16/3/2020 1. CDC recommends against any gathering of 50 or more people for an eight-week period 
(15/3) 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/large-events/mass-gatherings-
ready-for-covid-19.html 
2. Imperial Report 9: prediction for 2.2 million deaths in the U.S. 
https://www.imperial.ac.uk/media/imperial-college/medicine/mrc-gida/2020-03-16-
COVID19-Report-9.pdf 
3. U.S. President Donald Trump urges to avoid social gatherings in groups larger than 10 
people. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-usa-guidelines/trump-urges-us-
to-halt-most-social-activity-in-virus-fight-warns-of-recession-idUSKBN2133GT 
17/3/2020 The HHS report goes to public. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/17/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-plan.html 
24/3/2020 Rumors regarding a $2 trillion stimulus pack. 
https://abcnews.go.com/Business/futures-us-financial-markets-spike-overnight-hit-
limit/story?id=69765921 
30/3/2020 Dr. Anthony Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, said 
on Sunday 29, March that maybe more than 100,000 Americans could die of COVID-19, and 
that the US is going to have “millions of cases”. 
https://edition.cnn.com/2020/03/29/politics/coronavirus-deaths-cases-anthony-fauci-
cnntv/index.html 
9/4/2020 Dr. Fauci said that “The final toll currently "looks more like 60,000 than the 100,000 to 
200,000" that U.S. officials previously estimated. 
https://www.npr.org/2020/04/09/830664814/fauci-says-u-s-coronavirus-deaths-may-be-
more-like-60-000-antibody-tests-on-way 
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5. Statistical Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency. 
In this section, we present some statistical evidence that quantitatively confirms what we 
previously mentioned: that the stock market during the examined period was not efficient. At 
this point, we should note that the main objective of this study is not to present that the stock 
market is not efficient using econometric methods; however, some quantitative evidence is 
necessary.  
The EMH is based on the random walk hypothesis, according to which the future price is no 
more predictable than the path of accumulated random numbers. This means that the stock 
market instantly incorporates all the available information, thus future prices are influenced 
only by the news that is released. Therefore, an investor cannot use past prices of a certain 
asset to predict its future prices (Khan & Vieito (2012)). 
Before the efficiency tests, we examine the descriptive statistics of our sample. Table 3 
presents the descriptive statistics, which show that the data during the examined period 
02.01.2020-30.04.2020 are not normally distributed: Kurtosis=5.475>3, Skewness: -0.219≠0, 
and Jarque-Bera: 21.847 (statistically significant at the 1% confidence level). Figure 3 shows 
the non-normality of the distribution graphically. 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the S&P500 daily returns during the period 02.01.2020-
30.04.2020. 
 
S&P Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean -0.068% 
 Median 0.029% 
 Maximum 9.383% 
 Minimum -11.984% 
 Std. Dev. 3.374% 
 Skewness -0.219 
 Kurtosis 5.475 
 Jarque-Bera 21.847* 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at 1% confidence level. 
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Figure 3: Histogram of the S&P500 daily returns during the COVID-19 outbreak period 
(02.01.2020-30.04.2020). 
 
 
There are several tests that are presented in the financial literature that are used in order to 
examine the EMH. Khan & Vieito (2012) examine market efficiency using serial correlation test 
(ACF test), runs test, unit root test (Kwiatkowski, Philips, Schmidt, & Shin, 1992), multiple 
variance ratio test (Chow & Denning, 1993), and the non-parametric variance ratio test using 
ranks and signs (Wright, 2000). In our study, the sample is not large, therefore, amongst 
several popular tests the runs-test, which is appropriate for small samples, seems to be the 
most appropriate choice for testing the EMH in our sample (Islam, Watanapalachaikul, & Clark 
(2007)).  
If the markets are efficient, the sample distribution has random returns (positive and 
negative). As a run we define the repeated consequence of positive (or negative) returns. 
Some authors adopt a slightly different approach: instead of the positive (negative) returns, 
they examine the consequence of returns that are above (below) the mean return of the 
sample, and or the median. In this section, we adopt all these versions of the runs-test using 
as classification criterion: the zero, the average, and the median value. 
The mean return (μ) of the expected runs is given by the formula 
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𝝁 =
𝟐×𝜨𝒑×𝑵𝒏
𝑵
+ 𝟏           (6) 
and the standard deviation (σ) by the formula 
𝝈 = √
𝟐×𝑵𝒑×𝑵𝒏×(𝟐×𝑵𝒑×𝑵𝒏−𝑵)
𝑵𝟐×(𝑵−𝟏)
= √
(𝝁−𝟏)×(𝝁−𝟐)
𝜨−𝟏
      (7) 
, where Np=number of positive observations, Nn= number of negative observations, and 
N=Np+Nn the total number of observations. Therefore, the Z-statistic is 
𝒛 =
𝑼−𝝁
𝝈
            (8) 
, where U= the number of runs.  
Table 4 shows the results which indicate that the daily returns of our sample are not randomly 
distributed, either we adopt as classification criterion the zero-return criterion (Daily Return 
<> 0) or the average-return (Daily Return <> mean return) or the median return (Daily Return 
<> median return).  The p-values show that we should reject the randomness hypothesis at 
the 1%, 5% and 1% confidence level, respectively. This is a quantitative indication that the U.S. 
stock market is not efficient during the examined period.     
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Table 4: Run-tests for the S&P500 Daily Returns during the 02.01.2020-30.04.2020 period. 
Criterion for 
Positive/Negative 
Classification 
Number 
of Runs 
Expected 
Mean Number 
of Runs 
Expected Standard 
Deviation Number of Runs 
Number of Positive 
Observations (Npositive) 
Number of Negative 
Observations (Nnegative) 
Runs Test Value (Z) p-value 
Daily Return <> 0 56 42.494 4.527 42 41 2.984 0.0028* 
Daily Return <> mean 
return  
(-0.068%) 
54 42.446 4.521 43 40 2.555 0.0106** 
Daily Return <> median 
return  
(0.029%) 
56 42.494 4.523 42 41 2.948 0.0028* 
Note: * and ** indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% confidence level, respectively. 
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6. Conclusions 
This paper tries to present in a simple way the behavior of the US stock market during the 
COVID-19 outbreak period. The data and the released news show that the US stock market 
seems not always efficient during the COVID-19 outbreak period.  
In January and up to the PHEIC announcement, the stock market is positive 1.32% and with 
low standard deviation 0.66%. Even though the authorities did not give worrying messages 
regarding the COVID-19 outbreak in the US, was it rational to assume that an easily spread 
virus would not affect a country such as the U.S. with metropolitan centers and millions of 
travelers visiting from all around the globe? In our opinion, the indicator on which we should 
focus is standard deviation because the low standard deviation shows that the market does 
not have counterarguments regarding the 31.12.2019-29.01.2020 positive returns. That 
means that no scenario where COVID-19 becomes a global threat was taken into serious 
consideration. 
A financial analyst/supporter of the EMH may suggest that up to the PHEIC no official worrying 
declaration was made and so the markets reacted accordingly. Can we say the same for the 
period after the PHEIC announcement? The stock market’s performance during the first days 
after the PHEIC (up to 21.02.2020) does not show any cause for concern: positive returns and 
slightly increased standard deviation relative to the pre-PHEIC period, which means that the 
US stock market was not alarmed by the PHEIC. WHO sounded the alarm, PHEIC, over a global 
outbreak of the virus.  As a consequence, the PHEIC should lead to market decline due to an 
economic slowdown and due to increased risk aversion, but the market did not respond 
instantly, and rationally during this period. Was this response predictable? Our concerns are 
not only the positive returns from PHEIC announcement up to 21.02.2020, but once again the 
low standard deviations. Did all the market participants underestimate the PHEIC 
announcement, or was there overoptimism on the part of many investors, so the pandemic 
risk was absorbed?  
The market seems to incorporate the news regarding the COVID-19 outbreak after 24.02.2020 
and up to the end of the second period (10.03.2020); therefore, we could assume that finally 
the stock market incorporated the health risk. An EMH supporter may suggest that this is a 
slow response. However, the slow response means that in some periods the stock market 
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does not incorporate the available information. As Thaler mentions25, this is an issue on which 
further research should be done regarding the behavioral factor that could be added in an 
asset pricing model in order to turn a rational model into an efficient one. 
The 22.37% decline during the 11.03.2020 – 23.03.2020 period and the 30.17% growth during 
the 24.03.2020 -17.04.2020 period seem to instantly incorporate the negative news regarding 
the pandemic and the positive information regarding the economic relief programs, 
respectively. The increased standard deviations during the decline period are consistent with 
the leverage effect, but the volatility is high for a 30.17% rocket growth period. The latter may 
hide a disagreement regarding the fair value of the prices. For example, some investors may 
focus only on the positive influence by the relief programs and underestimate the fact that 
COVID-19 is still causing the death of thousands of people worldwide and in the U.S. On the 
other hand, other investors may not be so optimistic and take the pandemic scenario into 
account.  
The market’s controversial perceptions regarding the influence of the $2 trillion stimulus pack 
may be another explanation, e.g. relief programs may be a positive measure for the reduction 
of the economic impact of the pandemic, but it may lead to an inflation regime which 
influences the stock market prices either negatively (Fama and Schwert (1977)) or positively 
at long periods (Boudoukh and Richardson (1993)).  What is the rational response to the 
inflation regime?   
We mentioned many times that the stock market was not efficient during the examined 
period, examining only the market’s performance and the released news. Taking into 
consideration the properties of our sample, we used the runs-test which rejects the random 
walk hypothesis and provides statistical evidence that the U.S. stock market during the COVID-
19 pandemic was not efficient.  
Finally, we should highlight the fact the econometric tests for the EMH are heavily based on 
randomness, and this could be a topic for future research. If we assume that the runs tests 
indicate that returns are random during the last rocket growth period, does it mean that the 
market is efficient? Shares started rising in the US because of the announcement of the 
stimulus pack, but is a 30.17% growth rational? Randomness does not mean rationality; 
therefore, this crisis may give financial economist the chance to examine market efficiency 
under new circumstances. 
 
25 The interview is available on https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bM9bYOBuKF4&t=1799s, and the 
part we mentioned is on 28:39-28:53. 
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